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Information asymmetry leading to raised pooled price of insurance and
lowering of demand for insurance, usually portrayed as a bad outcome, both
for insurers and for society.

Economic vs actuarial adverse selection.
Adverse selection vs Moral hazard
Moral hazard occurs when asymmetric information leads to a change in
the behaviour of the policyholder after purchasing insurance.
Adverse selection occurs when there is an information asymmetry prior
to insurance purchase.

Our focus here is on adverse selection.
Question: Policymakers often see merit in restricting insurance risk
classification. How can we reconcile theory with practice?
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Introduction Motivating example
Motivation: Two risk-groups µL = 0.01 and µH = 0.04
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Insurance demand Assumptions
Why do people buy insurance?
Assumptions
Consider an individual with
an initial wealth W,
exposed to the risk of loss L,
with probability µ,
utility of wealth U(w), with U′(w) > 0 and U′′(w) < 0,
an opportunity to insure at premium rate pi.
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Insurance demand Expected utility: With and without insurance










Expected utility with insurance
Expected utility without insurance
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Insurance demand Modelling demand for insurance
Modelling demand for insurance
Simplest model:
If everybody has exactly the same W, L, µ and U(·), then:
All will buy insurance if pi < pic.
None will buy insurance if pi > pic.
Reality: Not all will buy insurance even at fair premium. Why?
Heterogeneity:
Even if individuals are homogeneous in terms of underlying risk,
they can still be heterogeneous in terms of risk aversion.
Source of Randomness:
An individual’s utility function: Uγ(w), where parameter γ is drawn from
random variable Γ with distribution function FΓ(γ).
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Insurance demand Modelling demand for insurance
Insurance demand
Standardisation
As certainty equivalent is invariant to positive affine transformations, we
assume Uγ(W) = 1 and Uγ(W − L) = 0 for all γ.
Condition for buying insurance:
Given a premium pi, an individual will buy insurance if:
Uγ (W − piL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
With insurance
> (1− µ)Uγ(W) + µUγ(W − L) = (1− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Without insurance
.
Demand as a function of premium:
Given a premium pi, insurance demand, d(pi), is:
d(pi) = P [UΓ (W − piL) > 1− µ] .
P Tapadar (University of Kent) How can adverse selection increase social welfare ATRC, June 2019 8 / 25
Insurance demand Modelling demand for insurance









(1 − µ)U(W) + µU(W − L)
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Insurance demand Iso-elastic demand
Iso-elastic demand
Constant demand elasticity














1Assumptions: W = L = 1, Uγ(w) = wγ and Γ has the following distribution function:
FΓ(γ) = P [Γ ≤ γ] =

0 if γ < 0
τ γλ if 0 ≤ γ ≤ (1/τ)1/λ
1 if γ > (1/τ)1/λ.
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Adverse selection Risk classification
Risk classification
Risk-groups
Suppose a population can be divided into 2 risk-groups where:
risk of losses: µ1 < µ2;
population proportions: p1, p2;






, i = 1, 2;
fair-premium demand: τi = di(µi) for i = 1, 2.
Assume for simplicity W = L = 1.
Note: The framework can be generalised for n > 2 risk-groups.
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Adverse selection Market equilibrium
Market equilibrium
For a randomly chosen individual, define:
Q = I [ Individual is insured ] ;
X = I [ Individual incurs a loss ] ;
Π = Premium offered to the individual.
Expected premium, claim and market equilibrium
Expected premium: E[QΠ] = p1 d1(pi1) pi1 + p2 d1(pi2) pi2.
Expected claim: E[QX] = p1 d1(pi1) µ1 + p2 d1(pi2) µ2.
Market equilibrium: E[QΠ] = E[QX].
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Adverse selection Full risk classification vs Pooling
Full risk classification vs Pooling
Full risk classification
If risk classification is allowed:
Equilibrium is achieved when pi1 = µ1 and pi2 = µ2.
No losses for insurers.
No (actuarial/economic) adverse selection.
Pooling
If risk classification is banned:
Pooled (equilibrium) premium is pi0, where µ1 ≤ pi0 ≤ µ2.
No losses for insurers! ⇒ No (actuarial) adverse selection.
Economic adverse selection!













Social welfare, S, under premium regime pi = (pi1, pi2), is the expected utility
for the whole population:
S(pi) = E
[
QUΓ(W −ΠL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Insured population





It is possible to split S(pi) into two components:
S(pi) = f (pi) + K,
where f (pi) depends on the premium regime under consideration, while K does not.
Full risk classification vs Pooling
S(µ): Social welfare under full risk classification.
S(pi0): Social welfare under pooling.
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Social welfare Full risk classification vs Pooling
Same iso-elastic demand elasticity λ
λ







λ < 1⇔ S(pi0) > S(µ)⇒ Pooling is better than full risk classification.
λ > 1⇔ S(pi0) > S(µ)⇒ Pooling is worse than full risk classification.
Empirical evidence suggests λ < 1 in many insurance markets.
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Social welfare Full risk classification vs Pooling















everywhere to the left of red boundary curve
S(pi0) < S(µ)
everywhere to the right of red boundary curve
S(pi0) > S(µ)
guaranteed in shaded area
for all population structures
S(pi0) = S(µ)
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Loss coverage Definition
Loss coverage
Individual utilities are inherently unobservable, so quantification of social
welfare can be problematic. An alternative approach is to quantify the
(observable) loss coverage.
Definition (Loss coverage)
For a premium regime pi, loss coverage is defined as expected population
losses compensated by insurance, i.e.:
LC(pi) = E[QX].
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Loss coverage Full risk classification vs Pooling
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Loss coverage Social welfare and loss coverage
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Conclusions
Conclusions
Adverse selection need not always be adverse.
Under realistic assumptions of insurance demand elasticities, restricting risk
classification can increase social welfare.
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Conclusions
Reference: Loss coverage blog
https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/loss-coverage/
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